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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LEWIS F. HANSEN,
d.b.a. HANSEN REALTY CO.,
Plaintiff and Respondent.

vs.

Case No.
9169

IVY B. SNELL,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF

APPELL~T

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ivy B. Snell, defendant and appellant, prosecutes this
appeal from a judgment rendered against her in favor of
plaintiff and respondent for a commission claimed to have
been contracted for and earned by plaintiff and respondent
growing out of an alleged agreement to pay a commission
because of an effort by plaintiff to sell some property belonging
to defendant and appellant.
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In the main, there is no conflict in the evidence. In our view
the case should have been disposed of as a matter of law upon
the pleadings. However, in order that the Court may have
before it the evidence which may be deemed material, we shall
give a brief summary thereof.
On August 19, 1958, defendant and appellant executed
and delivered to plaintiff and respondent what is designated
as an Apartment Listing on one side and as a Sales Agency
Contract on the other. Exhibit 1-P. On the side designated
as Apartment Listing is some printed matter and some handwriting. Following the printed word "Price" are the figures
in writing "$43,000" folowed in printing "cash," which in
turn are followed in writing by the words "Terms to suit
Seller." The writing on Exhibit 1-P is that of plaintiff and
respondent, except the signature of Mrs. Snell, defendant and
appellant. It was so testified to by plaintiff and respondent

(R. 23).
On the side of Exhibit 1-P, designated as Sales Agency
Contract, appears this language. Some words are scratched
out at the top of the page and the words "Hansen Realty"
written in. The document then reads:
"In consideration of your agreement to list the property
described on the reverse side of this contract with the
Multiple Listing Bureau of Salt Lake Real Estate Board
(these words have a line drawn through them as in- ·
dicated.) during the life hereof, and to use your efforts
to find a purchaser therefor, I hereby grant you for the
period of six months from date hereof, the exclusive
right to sell or exchange said property or any part
thereof, at the price and terms stated hereon, or at
6
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such other price, terms or exchange to which I may
agree.
During the life of this contract, if you find a buyer
who is ready, able and willing to buy said property
or any part thereof at said price and terms, or any other
price or terms to which I may agree in writing, or if I
agree to an exchange of said property or any part
thereof, or if said property or any part thereof is sold
or exchanged during said term by myself or any other
person, firm or corporation, I agree to pay you the Salt
Lake Real Esta,te Board commission on such sale or
exchange, or if it is sold or exchanged within three
months after such expiration to any person to whom
you or any member of the Mupltiple Listing Bureau
of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board have previously
offered it, I agree to pay you the commission above
stated; and in case of the employment of an attorney to
enforce any of the terms of this agreement, I agree to
pay a reasonable attorney's fee and all costs of col·lection."
On cross examination ~Ir. Hansen further testified, over
objection of his Counsel, that he had list~d the property last
year for $37,500.00, but was unable to sell it at that price;
that if she could get $43,000.00 cash that would take care of
the income tax (R. 24). That Mrs. Snell never refused to sell
the property on terms to suit her. That witness could not get
terms to suit her (R. 25). That witness showed Mrs. Snell
and her husband another place to help them make up their
minds; that he told Mrs. Snell she could remain in the house
where she was living a reasonable time (R. 26). That witness
does not recall receiving a copy of Exhibit A, which is attached
to the Answer, but he knew about it, and that Mrs. Snell had
made the offer contained therein (R. 27). That Bennetts
7
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would not accept the offer; they said they would accept it at
six per cent, or any per cent, but would not accept it at ten
per cent; that Bennetts said they would pay cash; that witness
does not recall that any offer was made except for cash (R.
29) . That witness did not get the consent of Mrs. Snell to
deposit the $1000.00 to her account (R. 30). That Mr. Nelson
brought the $1000.00 to witness and asked him to place the
credit of Mrs. Snell, and gave Mrs. Snell the deposit slip;
that he did know that Mrs. Snell refused to accept the money,
and that the same was returned to Bennett Motor Company
(R. 31).
On redirect examination Mr. Hansen testified that Mrs.
Snell never told him that she would not sell the property for
cash; that he told her that $43,000.00 was above market and
that she could pay her income taxes (R. 32).
At the conclusion of the testimony of Mr. Hansen his
attorney stated that he would not contend that Mr. Hansen
had made a filing with the County Clerk showing that he was
doing business. Counsel for plaintiff in the court below, respondent here, further stated that "the file contains the pleadings and evidence of the appearance we have made, and we
wish to submit the matter of attorney's fees on that evidence"

(R. 33).
Mrs. Snell, defendant and appellant, testified in part as
follows:
That when Mr. Hansen brought the listing to her she
asked him as to how the listing obligated her, to which Mr.
Hansen replied that "It's nothing. It's just to have a record
8
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for our files. You have nothing to worry about. I'll protect
you." That nothing was said at that time with respect to the
payment of income taxes (R. 34). That she had never refused
to sell the property on the terms alleged in her answer. She
testified that she received the letter marked Exhibit 7 (R. 35).
It will be noted in that letter signed by Jos. S. Nelson
it is in substance there stated that Bennett Motor Company
rejects the offer of Mrs. Snell to sell the property under the
terms contained in her letter of January 28, 1959. In that letter
a tender was made of the remainder of $43,000.00.

On cross examination Mrs. Snell testified that she had
known Mr. Hansen for about twelve years; that Mr. Hansen
has made possibly two sales of property for her (R. 36). That
the property here involved was listed with Mr. Hansen in 1957
and 1958; that in 1957 Mr. Hansen told witness that he was
offered $35,000.00 cash for the property; that she would not
sell the property for cash; that her only income was from
rental of the property and she would not sell for cash (R. 37).
Some of this answer was stricken, but the record does not
show just what was stricken. That witness did not discuss the
matter of whether she would accept $35,000.00 for the property (R. 38). That she informed Mr. Hansen in August, 1958,
that she wished to sell her property (R. 39). That she told
Hansen that Bennetts were anxious to buy the property, and
that Mr. Hansen was her friend, and h{( should probably have
the sale. That Mr. Bird had contacted witness about the sale
of the property to Bennett Motor (R. 40) . That Mr. Bird
had contacted witness before she signed the listing to Mr.
Hansen (R. 41). That she informed Mr. Hansen that Bennett
9
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Motor was interested in the purchase of the rear part of the
property, but that Mr. McDermott was not mentioned (R. 42).
That witness remembers seeing Exhibit 10, which is signed
by Bennett Motor Company; that Mr. Hansen brought a contract that Bennetts and McDermott would buy the property;
that witness was interested in selling the whole property, and
did not know how it was to be divided by McDermott and
Bennett Motor (R. 44). That when he brought the contract
he asked witness what terms she would accept, and she told
Mr. Hansen to give her time; that she does not recall of ever
asking Mr. Hansen to relieve her from the listing of the .
property (R. 45) . That witness told Mr. Hansen that she
wanted a home to live in before she sold her property (R. 47).
That witness considered the purchase of a duplex; that Mr.
Hansen brought a number of contracts to her to sign, but she
did not sign any of them (R. 48) . Witness knew that Bennetts
wanted to buy the property for cash; that she told Mr. Hansen
she would not sell the property for cash (R. 49) . That witness
must have a down payment and a monthly payment until the
property is paid for; that the ·original offer was for a down
payment of $5000.00 (R. 50). That the only offer witness made
was the one prepared by Judge Hansen; that the offer was
for 8%, if the buyer will assume the payment of the commission, and the monthly payment reduced to $350.00; that
witness's attorney mailed the offer; that witness did not state
her terms until she employed Judge Hansen (R. 52).
On redirect examination Mrs. Snell testified that Mr.
Hansen never told her that he had deposited a thousand dollars
to her credit; that she never told him to do that (R. 54). That
the thousand dollars did not remain to her credit; that she
10
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refused to accept the credit; that witness never refused to sell
the property to Bennett Motor Company (R. 55).
Plaintiff below, respondent here, was recalled and in
substance testified: That he had alisting of the property here
involved in about 1957 (R. 57). That he had a dozen conversations with Mrs. Snell about an offer to purchase the
property in 1957 (R. 58). Mr. Hansen was permitted to answer
over objection of Counsel for Mrs. Snell about a conversation
had with Mrs. Snell in 1957. Such testimony so admitted was
to the effect that Mrs. Snell would not state what amounts
she would take for the property less than the listed price
(R. 60).
Counsel for plaintiff, over objection of Counsel for defendant, was permitted to examine witness Hansen about
Exhibits 9 and 10 (R. 63). Mr. Hansen was again permitted
to testify about showing houses and property to Mrs. Snell
(R. 64) . Mr. Hansen further testified that Mrs. Snell told
him that she wanted to sell because negroes were moving near
by (R. 66). That at the time of the listing nothing of Importance was said (R. 67).
Mrs. Ruth C. Hansen, wife of plaintiff, was called as a
witness, but she was not permitted to testify to anything
which will be of aid in this controversy. Her testimony will
be found in the record of pages 69 to 71.
Ben C. Rich testified that he is in the real estate business;
that he is acquainted with Lewis F. Hansen, and has met Mrs.
Ivy B. Snell on one occasion (R. 71). That he met Mrs. Snell
when he delivered the offer to buy her property for cash. That
Mr. Hansen, Mr. McDermott, Mrs. Hansen or Mrs. Snell
11
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and her husband and witness was present at her home at the
time (R. 73). Over objection by defendant's Counsel, Mr.
Rich was permitted to testify that Mrs. Snell stated she decided
she didn't want to sell the property, and that witness stated
to Mrs. Snell that she had already sold her property. "We've
accepted your offer. Now you can name the terms, and we'll
conform to it, within reason." Mrs. Snell replied that "I don't
believe anybody can make me sell my property, if I don't want
to." That witness was aware of the listing of the property in
the year 1957 (R. 74). That Mrs. Snell refused to sign arty
of the documents that .Mr. Bird had (R. 76). That when
witness said we had accepted her offer, witness meant himself
and Mr. Hansen; that Mrs. Snell was told that she could have
either all cash or terms that were satisfactory to her (R. 77).
That witness did not know about the final offer she had made;
that witness did not know what terms he thought might be
satisfactory to her; that she_ said she had changed her mind
and didn't want to sell her property (R. 78).
Mr. Hansen was again recalled and identified Exhibits
12 and 13, the former was admitted, the latter rejected (R.
80-81).
Mrs. Snell was recalled on rebuttal and denied that she
had ever stated that she refused to sell the property here involved (R. 83).

It is further made to appear that Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 were
received in evidence at the time of the Pre-trial; Exhibit 5 was
also received in evidence (R. 84). It will be noted that in
Exhibit 2-P it shows that under date of November 14th Bruce
J. McDermott and Bennett Motor Company state that they
12
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accepted the offer of Mrs. Snell to sell the property here involved for "Price $43,000.00 cash. Terms to Suit Seller."
At the time of preparing appellant's Brief there cannot
be found the Exhibits that were received in evidence at the
Pre-trial.
In our opinion much of the evidence which we have
summarized should have been rejected, but we shall not discuss
that phase of the case because in our view the pleadings viewed
in the light of the evidence received present only questions of
law.
Following are the Points upon which appellant relies for
a reversal.
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING
THAT PLAINTIFF MAY MAINTAIN THIS ACTION FOR
ACOMMISSION NOTWITHSTANDING HE HAS FAILED
TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953, 42-2-1 (R. 89).
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING THAT
PART OF FINDING NO.2 WHEREIN IT WAS FOUND
THAT BY THE LISTING HERE INVOLVED DEFENDANT COVENANTED "TO PAY TO PLAINTIFF 5% OF
THE SALE PRICE AS A BROKER'S COMMISSION IF
PLAINTIFF SHOULD FIND A PURCHASER READY,
WILLING AND ABLE TO BUY SAID PROPERTY AT
SAID PRICE" (R. 87).

13
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POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING NO. 5 WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT THE BUYER
CONTINUED TO BE READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO
BUY SAID· PROPERTY ON REASONABLE "TERMS TO
SUIT SELLER" (R. 88) .

POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING NO.8 WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT THE INTEREST
RATE NOT BEING SPECIFIED, THE INTEREST RATE
SHOULD BE 6% PER ANNUM (R. 88).

POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING NO. 9
WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT IN EITHER EVENT THE
INTEREST RATE SHOULD BE 6% PER ANNUM ON
THE UNPAID BALANCE (R. 88) .

POINT SIX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING NO.
10 WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF'S BUYER
IS READY AND WILLING TO BUY SAID PROPERTY
ON THE TERMS STATED BY DEFENDANT WITH 6%
INTEREST (R. 88).
14
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POINT SEVEN
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
DEFENDANT ASSENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT FIXING THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO BE
ALLOWED PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY (R. 89).

POINT EIGHT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW NUMBERED 1 WHEREIN IT CONCLUDED THAT PLAINTIFF IS NOT BARRED BY THE
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 42-2-1, U.C.A., 1953, FROM
MAINTAINING THIS ACTION.

POINT NINE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING IS CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 2 WHEREIN IT CONCLUDED
THAT PLAINTIFF HAS FOUND A BUYER WILLING
TO PAY INTEREST AT 6% PER ANNUM ON THE UNpAID BALANCE (R. 89).

POINT TEN
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW NO.4 WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A COMMISSION OF 5%
ON $43,000.00, OR $2,150.00 (R. 89).
15
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POINT ELEVEN
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT
UPOI'.J THE GROUND THAT THE COMPLAINT FAILS
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UPON WHICH RELIEF
CAN BE GRANTED, IN THAT, PLAINTIFF ALLEGES
AND DEFENDANT ADMITS THAT DEFENDANT DID
NOT AND HAS NOT REFUSED TO PERFORM, AND IS
STILL NEGOTIATING WITH SAID PURCHASER TO
PURCHASE SAID PROPERTY, (R. 1 AND R. 7), AND
THAT, THEREFORE, THE BRINGING OF THE ACTION
WAS PREMATURE.
POINT TWELVE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
IN CONFORMITY WITH THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 4, 5, 6, 7 AND THAT PART
OF PARAGRAPH 11, OF DEFENDANT'S AMENDED
ANSWER WHEREIN IT IS ALLEGED THAT "PLAINTIFF
HAS IN THE :NIANNER ABOVE ALLEGED BEEN REPRESENTING THE PROPOSED PURCHASER."
ARGUMNT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING
THAT PLAINTIFF MAY MAINTAIN THIS ACTION FOR
A COMMISSION NOTWITHSTANDING HE HAS FAILED
TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, 1953, 42-2-1 (R. 89).
16
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It is provided by U.C.A. 1953, 42-2-1, that:
"No person or persons shall carry on or conduct or
transact business in this state under an assumed name
or under any designation, name or style, corporate,
partnership or otherwise, other than the real name or
names of the individual or individuals conducting or
transacting such business unless such person or persons
shall file in the. office of the County Clerk of the
county in which the principal place of business is or is
to be located, an affidavit setting forth the name under
which such business is or is to be conducted or transacted, and the full name or names of the person or
persons owing, conducting or transacting the same,
the location of the principal place of business with
the post office address or addresses of such person or
persons. Such affidavit shall be executed by the person
or persons so conducting or intending to conduct such
business."

Section 42-2-2, provides for an index to be kept by the
County Clerk, who shall collect a fee of $1.00 f.or his service.
Section 42-2-4 provides that any person who "fails to comply with the provisions of this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor.
There have been numerous adjudications by courts of last
resort construing statutes similar to the Utah statute above
quoted. The only Utah cases we are able to find dealing with
the construction of the Utah statute are: Putnam v. Industrial
Comm., 80 Utah 187, 208, 14 Pac. (2d) 973, and Christensen_
v. Johnson, 90 Utah 273, 61 Pac. (2d) 597. In the former case
it is held that the purpose of the statute is to give notice to
the public as to the name or names of persons conducting the
business. In the latter case it is held that when the defense
17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

failed to set up non-compliance with the statute on appeal
to the District Court, such defense is waived. The statute is
clearly intended as a measure to regulate business and not
a revenue measure. The only charge for filing the required
affidavit is $1.00. The law announced by this Court and the
courts generally is to the effect that when the purpose of an
act is to regulate business and not as a revenue measure and
make the failure to comply with the act a crime, the courts
refuse to permit the person failing to comply with such act
the right to enforce contracts made without a compliance with
the act. Andersen v. Johnson, 108 Utah 417, 160 Pac. (2d) 725.

It is said in 12 Am. fur., Sec. 163, page 658, that a distinction has been frequently recognized between statutes designed for the protection of the public and those designed
for the raising of revenue. It appears that all the courts agree
that where a statute was enacted to protect the public against
fraud or imposition or to safeguard the public health or morals,
an agreement in violation thereof is ordinary void." Numerous cases are cited in footnote 12 in support of the text. In 12
Am. fur., Sec. 161, page 656, the law is stated thus:
"In order that there may be an implied prohibition
the imposition of a penalty is not essential. In other
words, it is not necessary that a statute should impose
a penalty for doing or omitting to do something in
order to make void a contract which is opposed to its
operation. The observe of this proposition is, however,
the basis of awell-established rule, which originated
at least as early as the time of Lord Holt. The rule,
as stated in the early decisions, is that every agreement
made by or about a matter or thing which is prohibited
and made unlawful by any statute is void, though the
statute itself doth not mention that it shall be so, but
18
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only inflicts a penalty on the offender, because a penalty
implies a prohibition though there are no prohibitory
words in the statute . . . Lord Holt's remark is an
authority for the proposition that an agreement made
in direct violation of a statute providing a penalty for
the violation thereof is illegal though the contract is
not in express terms prohibitive or pronounced void."
It will be seen that numerous cases are cited under note 9 in
support of the text. We have examined a number of the cases
there cited, and the same support the law announced in the
text.
To the same effect is the law announced in 65 C.J.S.J Sec.
9 (b), page 14, et seq. See also: 38 Am. fur., 603, and 45
A.L.R. 216, where cases are cited from Indiana, Michigan,
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Texas, holding
that a failure to comply with a statute similar to the Utah
statute prevents the person so failing from bringing an action
to enforce a contract made without complying with said law.
It will be seen from a reading of the foregoing citations that
there is an apparent conflict in the adjudicated cases. However,
a number of cases which permit an action to be brought by
one not complying with a statute somewhat similar to the Utah
statute are readily distinguishable from the U~tah statute.
Thus some of the statutes provide that one who does business
under an assumed name must file a verified statement containing his true name. Under such a statute it is held in some
of the cases that if the surname is used, the one so using his
surname need not file the required statement. It will be seen
that our statute expressly provides that the statement which is
required to be filed with the County Clerk must contain the
full name or names of the person or persons owning, conduct-
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ing or transacting the same and the principal place of business
of the one conducting the business. The plaintiff in this case
having failed to comply with U.C.A. 1953, 42-2-1 oi the Utah
statutes should not be permitted to maintain this action (R. 89).

POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING THAT
PART OF FINDING NO. 2 WHEREIN IT WAS FOUND
THAT BY THE LISTING HERE INVOLVED DEFENDANT COVENANTED "TO PAY TO PLAINTIFF 5% OF
THE SALE PRICE AS A BROKER'S COMMISSION IF
PLAINTIFF SHOULD FIND A PURCHASER READY,
WILLING AND ABLE TO BUY SAID PROPERTY AT
SAID PRICE" (R. 87).
The only provision in the listing is "I agree to pay you
the Salt Lake Real Estate Board commission on such sale or
exchange." It is not clear as to whether the commission should
be paid to plaintiff or to the Real Estate Board, or whether
the word "you" refers to plaintiff or to the Salt Lake Real
Estate Board. The difficulty, however, lies much deeper. There
is not one word of evidence as to what commission is fixed
or charged by the Salt Lake Real Estate Board. U.C.A. 1953,
78-25-1, contains provisions as to what the Court may judicially
know. The commission that the Salt Lake Real Estate Board
charges is not one of those matters. It will also be observed
that defendant denies that she is owing plaintiff any commission (R. 87).
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POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING NO. 5 WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT THE BUYER
CONTINUED TO BE READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO
BUY SAID PROPERTY ON REASONABLE "TERMS TO
SUIT SELLER'' (R. 88) .

l

The evidence in this case shows that the prospective
purchaser at all times prior to the commencement of this
action insisted on purchasing the property here involved for
cash. At no time did they, or either of them, make any offer
to purchase the property on an installment basis. However, in
one of the communications the prospective purchaser did say
that they would accept the offer to purchase the property "on
terms to suit the seller." Bennett Motor Company gave to
the plaintiff one thousand dollars to place to the credit of defendant in her bank. This was evidently done in order to trick
defendant into a position where she agreed to accept cash.
When plaintiff and a :Nlr. Rich, who represented one of the
purchasers, called on defendant, they, according to the testimony of Mr. Rich, insisted that Mrs. Snell had sold her property (R. 74 and 77). It is true that Mrs. Snell delayed for
some time before making up her mind as to the terms she was
willing to 'accept. Her husband was seriously ill at the time,
and later passed away (R. 45) .
It will be seen from defendant's Amended Answer that
on January 26, 1959, she made known the terms that she was
willing to accept (R. 9, Exhib,it A). There is no evidence
which shows or tends to show that defendant was not willing
to accept such terms up to and at the time of the trial. The
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Court found that such offer was made (R. 88, paragraph 6).
Plaintiff contended in the court below, and apparently the
Trial Court found, that the terms therein were either unreasonable or not within the terms of the agreement. The terms
that Mrs. Snell stated she would accept are: $5000.00 in cash,
and the unpaid balance to be paid in installments of $400.00
per month, with interest at 10% per annum, if Mrs. Snell is
to pay the commission, and if Mrs. Snell is not to pay a commission, by installments of $350.00 per month, with interest
at 8% per annum. The earned interest shall first be paid and
the balance to be applied on the principal. The amount not
paid to be secured either by a mortgage on the property sold
or on other property of equal value. See Exhibit A attached to
the Amended Answer (R. 9) . In making the offer, Mrs. Snell
stated that she did not 'admit that she was obligated to pay
a commission.
It will be seen that throughout the negotiations for the
sale of listed property plaintiff did all he could to aid the
prospective purchaser by attempting to trick defendant into a
position where she was bound to accept cash for the property.
Having failed to accomplish that end, he brought this action
with the apparent purpose of causing defendant to believe
that she must pay a real estate commission even though she
was unable to secure a deal on "terms to suit the seller."
It is alleged in the Complaint and admitted in the Amended
Answer that "defendant has not refused to perform and is
still negotiating with the said purchaser," etc. Under the listing
Mrs. Snell did not agree to pay a commission for securing a
prospective purchaser who merely engaged in negotiating for
the purchase of the listed property.
22
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The interest which Mrs. Snell exacted on the unpaid principal is within the amount which the Legislature has ordained
are proper charges. The law of Utah expressly permits a
charge of interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum. U.C.A.
1953, 15-1-2, for the loan or forbearance· of any money, goods
or things in action. The Legislature having so provided, it ·
would seem idle to contend that such a charge of interest is
unreasonable. When plaintiff secured .the signature of Mrs.
Snell to the listing he must have known that she retained the
right to state that the terms which suited her would call for
payment with interest on all deferred payments to carry interest
at 10% per annum. If he did not wish to undertake to secure
a buyer who was willing to accept such terms, it was up to
him to make other provisions in the listing when he prepared
the same. It is fair to assume that plaintiff was well aware
of the fact that many sellers of property are unwilling to
accept a payment so large that it will cast an immediate obligation upon the seller to pay the entire income tax on the
profit made. So also is it fair to assume that one who sells
property which is to be paid Jor at a substantial time in the
future is taking a great risk that the value of money will
further depreciate in value before the payment is made. The
magazines, the press, the radio and television are full of such
predictions. Moreover, there are many buyers who are willing
and anxious to buy property on the installment plan with payments extended over a long period of time. Plaintiff in the
court below, respondent here, may not be heard to say that
he was not aware that defendant had a right to say that the..
"terms to suit the seller" were the terms submitted by her.
Before plaintiff has any cause of action against defendant he
23
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is required to produce such a purchaser. He has not done so,
but on the contrary, has devoted his energies in an attempt
to get defendant to accept terms to suit a prospective purchaser.

POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL' COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING NO.8 WHEREIN" IT FOUND THAT THE INTEREST
RATE NOT BEING SPECIFIED, THE INTEREST RATE
SHOULD BE 6% PER ANNUM (R. 88).
It is a well-established law that a contract must be construed most strongly against the one who draws the contract.
12 Am. fur., Sec. 252, page 795, and cases there cited. The
written part of the listing is in the handwriting of plaintiff
and respondent, except the signature of Mrs. Snell (R. 23).
It is also well settled that effect must be given when possible
to every sentence, phrase and word contained in a written
contract. 12 Am. fur., Sec. 241, page 772, et seq., and cases
there cited. Among such cases. are: Vitagraph v. American
Theatre Co., 77 Utah 71, 291 Pac. 303; Anderson v. Great
Eastern Casualty Co., 51 Utah 78, 168 Pac. 966; Smith v.
Bowman, 32 Utah 33, 88 Pac. 687.

If, as is provided in the listing, the terms of the sale
should be satisfactory to the seller, to say that such language
meant that only 6% may be charged on deferred payments,
is to ignore the plain meaning of the language. The words
"terms to suit the seller" apply to the payment of interest on
deferred payments as well as to the amount and time of the
installment payments. In the case of Blackburn v. Bozo, 82
24
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Utah 556, 26 Pac. (2d) 543, the Court cited with approval
the following meaning of the word "terms" as used in a
contract of listing property for sale by a broker:
"The true meaning of the provision 'turns on a
definition of the word terms which is said in 38 Cyc.
184' in its plural forms, in its restricted and legal sense
and as used chiefly in reference to contracts to signify
the conditions, limitations and propositions which comprise and govern the acts which the contracting parties
agree expressly or impliedly to do or not to do; conditions, propositions stated or made which when assented to or accepted by another settles the contract
and bind the parties."
The same thought is thus expressed in Biack' s Law Dictionary, 2nd Ed. 1146, in this language:
"In law of contracts and in court practice the word
(terms) is generally used in the plural and terms are
conditions, propositions stated or promises made when
assented to or accepted by another, settle the contract
and bind the parties."
We are unable to find a case and doubt that one can be found
where the use of the word "terms" in a contract means that
the interest rate on. deferred payments shall be 6% per annum.
POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING NO.9
WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT IN EITHER EVENT THE
INTEREST RATE SHOULD BE 6% PER ANNUM ON
THE UNPAID BALANCE (R. 88) .
We adopt what is said under Point Four in support of
this Point Five (R. 88).
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POINT SIX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING NO.
10 WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF'S BUYER
IS READY AND WILLING TO BUY SAID PROPERTY
ON THE TERMS STATED BY DEFE~DANT WITH 6%
INTEREST (R. 88).
If plaintiff's buyer was ready or willing to buy the property
on terms stated by defendant with 6% interest, they kept such
willingness a profound secret. The Court will look in vain in
the pleadings or the evidence in support of such finding. As
will be seen from the evidence the prospective purchaser
insisted on paying the full purchase price in cash. In this connection, the attention of the Court is directed to the law
which holds that by plaintiff's insistency that defendant accept
a cash payment of $43,000.00, the prospective purchaser
rejected .all offers that defendant might make upon terms to
suit her unless such offer was for cash. When an offer is
made to sell property and such offer is not accepted, but a
different counter offer is made, such counter offer is in law a
rejection of the first offer. 17 C.J.S., Sec. 403, page 381, et seq.,
and cases there cited in footnotes.

POINT SEVEN
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
DEFENDANT ASSENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT FIXING THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO BE
ALLOWED PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY (R. 89).
There is an absence of any evidence to support the above
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attacked Finding, and likewise there is no evidence of any
agreement as to the payment of attorney's fee, or as to the
reasonable value thereof. What occurred with respect to
attorney's fee appears on page 33 of the record where Counsel
for plaintiff stated "that the file contains the pleadings, and
evidence of appearance we have made, and we wish to submit
the matter of attorney's fees on that evidence." However, as
no attorney fee was allowed, this Finding is not prejudicial
and we will not discuss this phase of the case in this Brief.

POINT EIGHT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW NUMBERED 1 WHEREIN IT CONCLUDED THAT PLAINTIFF IS NOT BARRED BY THE
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 42-2-1, U.C.A., 1953, FROM
MAINTAINING THIS ACTION.
We adopt what is said under Point One in support of
this Point.

POINT NINE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING IS CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 2 WHEREIN IT CONCLUDED
THAT PLAINTIFF HAS FOUND A BUYER WILLING
TO PAY INTEREST AT 6% PER ANNUM ON THE UNPAID BALANCE (R. 89).
Appellant adopts what is said under Points Four and Six
in support of this Point (R. 89) .
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POINT TEN
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW NO.4 WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A COMMISSION OF 5%
ON $43,000.00, OR $2,150.00 (R. 89).
Appellant adopts what is said under Point Two in support
of this Point (R. 89) .

POINT ELEVEN
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT
UPON THE GROUND THAT THE COMPLAINT FAILS
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION UPON WHICH RELIEF
CAN BE GRANTED, IN THAT, PLAINTIFF ALLEGES
AND DEFENDANT ADMITS THAT DEFENDANT DID
NOT AND HAS NOT REFUSED TO PERFORM, AND IS
STILL NEGOTIATING WITH SAID PURCHASER TO
PURCHASE SAID PROPERTY, (R. 1 AND R. 7), AND
THAT, THEREFORE, THE BRINGING OF THE ACTION
WAS PREMATURE.
Little need be added to what has already been said in
support of this Point.· It is, of course, elementary that a cause
of action must depend on the facts as they exist at the time
the action is commenced. All that is alleged in the Complaint
is that plaintiff had been successful in getting prospective
purchasers to negotiate with defendant for the purchase and
sale of the listed property. No one could then tell whether
such negotiations would result in a sale. It may well be that
28
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r
if plaintiff had not brought this untimely action, the parties
would have been able to agree upon terms that suited the seller.
POINT TWELVE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
IN CONFORMITY WITH THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 4, 5, 6, 7 AND THAT PART
OF PARAGRAPH 11, OF DEFENDANT'S AMENDED
ANSWER WHEREIN IT IS ALLEGED THAT ''PLAINTIFF
HAS IN THE MANNER ABOVE ALLEGED BEEN REPRESENTING THE PROPOSED PURCHASER."
It has been repeatedly and uniformly held by this Court
that in cases tried before the Court without a jury the Court
must find on all material issues which .find support in the
evidence. Among such cases are Thomas v. Farrell} 82 U. 535,
26 Pac. (2d) 328; Cleverly v. District Court} 85 Utah 440, 39
Pac. (2d) 748. It is equally settled that it is the duty of an
agent to faithfully serve his principals. That a real estate broker
may not serve both seller and buyer without their consent.

For the reasons stated appellant prays that the judgment
appealed from be reversed and that the Court below be directed
to dismiss plaintiff's alleged cause of action, and that appellant
be awarded her costs.
Respectfully submitted,
ELIAS HANSEN
Attorney for Appellant
721-26 Continental Bank
Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
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